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PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976)
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart' the
Court was asked to review the validity of a judicial
order to the news media prohibiting the publication
of information about a criminal trial. The Court,
balancing the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
sixth amendment against the right to free press as
guaranteed by the first amendment, held that any
prior restraint of the press bears a "heavy presump-
tion" against its validity; and the facts in this case
were not so compelling as to require the Nebraska
district court to issue a prior restraint in order to
guarantee a fair trial. The case is significant chiefly
because of the seemingly insurmountable barrier
which the Court has raised to all future "gag" orders
against press coverage of criminal trials.
On October 19, 1975, Erwin C. Simants was
arrested for the murder of six persons in a small
Nebraska town. Local public concern and fear about
the murders was great. Widespread press coverage,
which had begun the night of the murders with the
publication of the suspect's description, continued for
three days after the arrest. At that point, both the
prosecution and defense attorneys asked the county
court to enter an order restricting further publicity. 2
After the county court heard oral argument on the
motion, 5it issued a restrictive order which prohibited
the publication of information gained at pretrial
hearings and made the otherwise voluntary Nebras-
ka Bar-Press Guidelines mandatory. " The county
court did not restrict attendance at the pretrial
'96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
2State v. Simants, 194Neb. 783, 784, 236 N.W.2d 794,
796-797 (1975).
3The county court took no evidence.
'The crucial sections of the guidelines are:
Information Generally Not Appropriate for
Disclosure, Reporting
Generally, it is not appropriate to disclose or report
the following information because of the risk of
prejudice to the right of an accused to a fair trial:
1. The existence or contents of any confession,
admission or statement given by the accused, except it
may be stated that the accused denies the charges
made against him. This paragraph is not intended to
apply to statements made by the accused to represen-
tatives of the news media or to the public.
2. Opinions concerning the guilt, the innocence or
the character of the accused.
hearings, but only the publication of information
presented at the hearings.
On the same day the order was issued, a prelimi-
nary hearing was held and Simants was bound over
to the district court for trial. Several press groups
immediately moved for leave to intervene, asking that
the restrictive order be vacated. They were allowed
to intervene 5 and the district court held a hearing on
the order. With the testimony of the county judge
and newspaper articles before him, Judge Stuart
found a "clear and present danger" that publicity
could impinge on the defendant's right to a fair trial. '
He then issued his own order, which encompassed
the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines, and prohibited
any publication of incriminating evidence against
the defendant.
The Nebraska Press Association then asked the
Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a
stay, and an expedited appeal from the order. The
Association also applied to Justice Blackmun, as
Circuit Judge, to stay the order. Justice Blackmun at
first refused to issue a stay, in deference to the
Nebraska Supreme Court. A week later, however,
Justice Blackmun did issue an opinion staying the
district court order insofar as it purported to make
the voluntary Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines man-
datory rules of the court. However, he did not
prohibit the Nebraska courts from issuing some type
of restrictive order over publicity at the trial. An
application to the full United States Supreme Court
for an immediate and more extensive stay was
denied. 8
3. Statements predicting or influencing the out-
come of the trial.
4. Results of any examination or tests or the
accused's refusal or failure to submit to an examination
or test.
5. Statements or opinions concerning the credibil-
ity or anticipated testimony of prospective witnessess.
6. Statements made in the judicial proceedings
outside the presence of the jury relating to confessions
or other matters which, if reported, would likely
interfere with a fair trial.
96 S.Ct. at 2829, App. A.
5194 Neb. at 795-96, 236 N.W.2d at 802.
'See note 46 infra.
'423 U.S. 1319 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice, 1975).
8423 U.S. 1027 (1975).
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Subsequent to Justice Blackmun's order, the
Nebraska Supreme Court issued a new order to
remain in effect until the jury was impaneled. That
order prohibited the press from releasing any infor-
mation on the existence of a confession, on the nature
of.the confession, and any facts "strongly implica-
tive" of the guilt of the accused. ' The Nebraska
Supreme Court's decision was premised on the vital
importance of a fair trial to both society and the
defendant. The Nebraska court noted that state law
requires that Simants be tried within six months of
his arrest and allows changes of venue only to
neighboring counties. "In the eyes of the court these
laws and the sensational nature of the case put the
defendant's right to a fair trial in jeopardy: wide-
spread press coverage would infect neighboring
jurisdictions and :would not die down before trial.
Under these circumstances, the court felt an order
restricting press coverage was justified. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari " to consider the
restrictive order as issued by the Nebraska Supreme
Court. 12
The primary issue facing the Court in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart " was the clash between
the first and sixth amendments. In criminal trials of a
sensational nature, an unfettered press could make a
fair trial difficult if not impossible. In the instant
case, in an attempt to guarantee a fair trial, the
Nebraska courts, as had other courts before them, 14
ordered temporary restraints on press coverage. The
Nebraska order was not meant to obliterate the first
amendment. right to describe all events at the trial.
'194 Neb. at 801, 236 N.W.2d at 805. The text of the
order.was as follows:
The order'of the District Court of October 27,
1975, is vacated'and is modified and reinstated in the
following respects: It shall be effective only as to
events which have occurred prior to the filing of this
opinion, and only as it applies to the relators herein,
and only insofar as it restricts publication of the
existence or content of the following, if any such
there be: (1) Confessions or admissions against in-
terest made by the accused to law enforcement offi-
cials. (2) Confessions or admissions against interest,
oral or written, if any, made by the accused to third
parties, excepting any statements, if any, made by the
accused to representatives of the news media. (3)
Other information strongly implicative of the accused
as the perpetrator of the slayings.
"0 Id. at 797-798, 236 N.W.2d at 803.
21423 U.S. 1027 (1975).
1296 S.Ct. at 2794.
1396 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
"'According to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, there have been as many as 174 cases involving
restrictive orders since 1966. Landau, The Challenge of the
Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55 (1976).
Rather, the court had simply delayed that right until
after the trial jury was impaneled. But all nine U.S.
Supreme Court Justices felt the order could not
withstand constitutional attack.
The Court 15 was first faced with the problem of
mootness, as the order against publication had
expired in January, 1975, when the trial of Simants
began. The Court concluded that review of the order
was proper because- orders of this type would
otherwise consistently evade review. 16 Moreover,
this decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court would
act as precedent for future restrictive orders in sen-
sational cases. "' In particular, this controversy
might well recur for Simants, should he win an ap-
peal of his conviction. "
Justice Burger began by pointing out that the
controversy over the effect of pretrial press coverage
has existed as long as the American judicial system. "
Concern over free press-fair trial issues has led over
the years to a plethora of studies, recommendations,
and agreements 0 which attempt to ease the tension
between first and sixth amendment rights. But that
tension still exists. According to the Court, this
important and difficult controversy arose from two
separate lines of cases. 21 One line, holding the first
amendment paramount, took severe steps to prevent
5Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun. Justices
Powell and White also joined in the Court's opinion and
added comments of their own in separate concurring
opinions. Justice Brennan concurred in the result and wrote
a separate opinion joined byJustices Stewart and Marshall.
Justice Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's opinion and
added his own concurring opinion. It was thus a unani-
mous court decision but only five justices joined in the




91d. at 2797-98. The need for a searching voir dire
was, according to the Court, emphasized as early as 1807 in
the case of Aaron Burr. In that case Chief Justice Marshall
made special attempts to search out biases among prospec-
tive jurors. In the 1930's the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for
the murder of the Lindbergh child was a model of
prejudicial press coverage.
2 Voluntary agreements have been reached between the
news media and state bar associations in at least 23 states.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: LEGAL ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIAL/FREE
PRESS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 6 (1974). A judicial com-
mittee has conducted a study into the problem and sug-
gested possible solutions. 45 F.R.D. 391 (1966). The
American Bar Association has promulgated a full set of
standards regarding the conflict of the fair trial mandate
and the mandate of free speech. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIA-
TION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, (1968).
2 196 S.Ct. at 2803.
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the use of prior restraints. The other line of cases
commanded the courts to maintain impartial juries.
The Court noted that the right to a fair trial is
basic to the American system of criminal justice, and
that one important safeguard of that right is the
impartiality of jurors. A long line of cases dealing
with the right to a fair trial has focused on this
requirement. For instance, in Irvin v. Dowd, 22a case
in which pretrial publicity was alleged to have biased
the jury, the Court said:
In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the
criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
"indifferent" jurors. The failure to accord an accused
a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of
due process. 2
To the Dowd court, a change of venue to a
neighboring county "exposed to essentially the same
news coverage" was insufficient to dispel the preju-
dice of the jury. In the words of the Court, "[w]ith
his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that
petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by
so huge a wave of public passion. "24A new
trial was ordered.
In Rideau v. Louisiana" the defendant's convic-
tion was overturned because the local police released
to the news media a filmed confession by the accused
which was subsequently shown several times on
television. According to the Court, such a display,
seen by members of the jury, could only act to
prejudice their decision."'
Similarly, in Estes v. Texas, 27 massive pretrial
publicity and the courtroom presence of hundreds of
newsmen and television cameramen was held to have
denied the accused due process of law. The court-
room atmosphere was not conducive to a "sober
search for the truth."' 28 In that case the Court
admonished state and federal courts to maintain a
proper decorum in the courtroom "at all costs.",
2 9
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his concurring opin-
ion, emphasized that "no procedure or occurrence"
which threatened the right of a "fair and reliable"
verdict could be tolerated. " Such emphatic language
acted as a catalyst for the development of various
2366 U.S. 717 (1961).
2 1d. at 722.
"4 1d. at 728, quoted in 96 S.Ct. at 2799. In this in-
stance eight of the twelve jurors thought the defendant
guilty before the trial, though they said they could give an
impartial verdict.
25373 U.S. 723 (1963).
"Id. at 726.
27381 U.S. 532 (1965).
21d. at 551.
21Id. at 540.
"Id. at 564 (Warren, C. J., concurring).
methods to curb the prejudicial effect of publicity.
Of all the trial publicity cases, the case of Dr. Sam
Sheppard was undoubtedly the most important in
terms of guidance for blunting prejudicial publici-
ty. "' Dr. Sheppard was convicted for the murder of
his wife in 1954. Twelve years later his counsel
persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court that the volume
and the nature of the publicity before and during the
trial had prejudiced the jury. The original trial judge
had taken few measures to safeguard the right of Dr.
Sheppard to an impartial jury. In ordering a new
trial the Supreme Court made explicit what the trial
court should have done. It should either have
continued the trial until publicity had died down or
ordered a change of venue. " Even without a motion
from the participants, the judge should have insisted
on sequestering the jury. 22 Additionally, the judge
should have ordered all lawyers, witnesses and court
personnel to say nothing about the case. 24 Finally,
the trial court should have requested that the press
follow certain minimal voluntary guidelines on the
publishing of highly prejudicial news items. "
Each of these cases illustrated exceptional cir-
cumstances in which pretrial publicity was so vast
that there was little doubt that the impartiality of
jurors had been destroyed. In contrast, the Court
pointed out other cases in which it had refused to
order new trials,2 " finding no proof of "actual
prejudice" or of an "inherently prejudicial set-
ting." 7A juror's preconceived notions are not alone
a basis for dismissal. 28 Indeed, recently the Court
refused to reverse the murder conviction of "Murph
the Surph" despite the fact that some jurors knew his
past criminal record. 9 The possibility of prejudice
was not considered great enough for reversal. Proof
of prejudice, by inference or otherwise, must be clear.
"1Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Other
major cases of the period were: Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).




"8Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975);
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181 (1951).
"1The standard enunciated for evaluation of prejudice
was:
Petitioner has failed to show that the setting of the
trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury
selection process of which he complains permits an
inference of actual prejudice.
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 803.
"Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723.
"9Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 800.
[Vol. 67
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The Court concluded from its review of these cases
"that pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse
publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair
trial." " While the "tone and effect" of that publicity
can prejudice the trial, those factors could be
"shaped" by the conduct of "attorneys, police and
other officials." "The trial judge in particular has a
crucial role to play in controlling the extent and effect
of pretrial publicity through the use of such measures
as described in the Sheppard case. "Traditionally it
has been the trial court's burden to guarantee that all
measures are taken to prevent prejudice; and the
Court took special notice that the trial judge in this
instance acted responsibly in an effort to protect the
defendant. "' The Supreme Court could not ignore,
however, a significant competing interest which the
first amendment protects. Thus, against this fair trial
background, it turned to an examination of the
strong tradition opposed to the use of prior restraints
of any kind over the press.
In Near v. Minnesota "the Court made its famous
statement that "it has been generally, if not univer-
sally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
[first amendment] guaranty to prevent previous
restraints upon publication.""9 Only in cases dealing
with obscenity, national security, and incitements to
violence has the Court allowed prior restraints of
expression. And even in those limited areas the test
adopted by the Court is a difficult one to pass: "'
"Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 96 S.Ct. at
2800.
" Id. at 2805.
42See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
4396 S.Ct. at 2804.
44283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court in Near was
aware that harm might at times result from unrestrained
press coverage. This did not prevent the Court from taking
its very strong stand against the use of prior restraints. As
the Court noted:
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused
by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any
the less necessary the immunity of the press from
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist




4Id. at 716. The limitations which have been allowed
by the Supreme Court can give one some idea of the
unwillingness of the Court to impose prior restraints. In
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918), Justice
Holmes was careful to note that the leafleting of draftees by
Schenck was aimed at encouraging disunity and dismay
among new military members. National security was the
basis for imposing silence on Schenek. In a time of war such
drastic measures can be allowed. An important requisite is
that there must be a "clear and present danger" of harm to
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. 47
More recently in New York Times v. United
States,"' all nine Justices reiterated that prior
restraints of the press were presumptively uncon-
stitutional.
In the Times case, the temporary nature of the
restrictive order, which prohibited the publication of
the Pentagon Papers, did not affect the Court's
determination. Any limitation on freedom of the
press bears a "heavy presumption" against its
validity. 41 Prior restraints virtually freeze speech. "
Once the order is issued, the results are immediate
and irreversible. The timely nature of reporting
requires immediate publication if it is to serve its
purpose of informing the people. In the instant case
the Nebraska courts were trying to control the
reporting of news events. Thus, they had to demon-
strate a basis for imposing a prior restraint which
would overcome the "heavy presumption" of uncon-
stitutionality.
The Court used three criteria in its examination of
the facts:
(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage;
(b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate
the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent
the threatened danger. "
With regard to the nature and extent of publicity,
the Supreme Court found the district judge was
correct in assuming that there would be extensive
pretrial publicity in the Simants case. However, the
Court pointed out that the trial judge could not
precisely predict what effect that publicity would
have on the jurors. His conclusions were of necessity
speculative because he was dealing with psychologi-
cal factors which were "unknown and unknow-
justify a prior restraint. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
""Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963). See also, New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (attempt to restrain publication of the
Pentagon Papers held improper); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (enjoinment of
pamphleting over an entire city held improper as a prior
restraint); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181
(1968) (restraining order which had the effect of banning a
racist rally overturned).
48403 U.S. 713 (1971).





able." 52 He could therefore not be sure the action
he was taking was necessary.
The Court found that neither the Nebraska
Supreme Court nor the district court considered the
use of less drastic measures, and both lower court
opinions could, at most, only imply that such
methods would be inadequate. Since, the Supreme
Court noted, findings of prejudicial publicity do not
automatically lead to reversals, the Nebraska court
should have considered the possibility of conducting a
fair trial in spite of the publicity before issuing its
ban. 5
The Nebraska courts found that publicity might
jeopardize Simants' right to a fair trial, not that it
would surely lead to an unfair trial. In such a situa-
tion, restrictive measures may not be necessary at all.
If they are, Justice Burger stresses that the gravity
of prior restraints is such that all alternatives, includ-
ing sequestering orders, orders for silence over court
personnel, voluntary codes, lengthy voir dire, and
change of venue should be evaluated before a gag
order is approved. "'
Finally, the Court analyzed the feasibility of the
order and concluded that "the reality of the problems
of managing and enforcing pretrial restraining or-
ders" made the orders essentially unworkable. "
Not only would the court have difficulty determining
before publication what type of publicity would be
prejudicial to the defendant, it would also have




5 The Court looked to Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
at 357-62, for a description of methods for protecting sixth
amendment rights. The methods, as the Court described
them, were:
(a) change of trial venue to a place less exposed to the
intense publicity that seemed imminent in Lincoln
County; ... (b) postponement of the trial to allow
public attention to subside; (c) use of searching ques-
tioning of prospective jurors, as Chief Justice Mar-
shall did in the Burr case, to screen out those with
fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence; (d) the use of
emphatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of
each juror to decide the issues-only on evidence
presented in open court. Sequestration of jurors is, of
course, always available. Although that measure in-
sulates jurors only after they are sworn, it also en-
hances the likelihood of dissipating the impact of
pretrial publicity and emphasizes the elements of the
jurors' oaths.
96 S.Ct. at 2805.
5596 S.Ct. at 2806.
"Id. Only the voluntary submission to the court of the
Nebraska Press Association created a case to decide. Many
major papers were beyond the personal jurisdiction of the
court and never did submit to the court's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court noted that eliminating pub-
licity may not solve the problem of prejudice because
without press coverage the community may become
enveloped in rumors which would be even more
damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts.
In fact, the pretrial publicity may perform the
salutary function of keeping the public informed
and dispelling harmful rumors. "
However, the Court found this particular order
faulty for two additional reasons. First, the order
attempted to prevent the publication of information
presented in an open court proceeding. Relying on
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, " Craig v. Harney, "and
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 6othe Supreme Court empha-
sized that "there is nothing that proscribes the press
from reporting events that transpire in the court-
room." 61Second, the Court found that the third pro-
viso of the Nebraska Supreme Court ruling banning
publication of facts "strongly implicative of the guilt
of the accused," was too vague and too broad to sur-
vive scrutiny. 62
Although the Court focused carefully on the facts
of this particular case, it made special note that its
conclusion was not "simply a result of assessing the
adequacy of the showing made in this case; it results
in part from the problems inherent in meeting the
heavy burden of demonstrating, in advance of trial,
that without prior restraint a fair trial will be
denied." "The first amendment can not be restricted
on the speculation that publicity might make a fair
trial difficult. 64 Furthermore, the Court notes that
"the practical problems of managing and enforcing
restrictive orders is an almost impossible task." 65
Thus, though the Court refused to completely rule
out the use of restrictive orders, the Nebraska Press
Association case, in effect, makes the "heavy pre-
Indeed, several national news magazines published the for-
bidden information. Landau, Free Press Boon: A Stop to
Direct Gag Orders?, TRIAL 127, September 1976.
1196 S.Ct. at 2806. In a sense this argument alone could
have been used to dispel the notion that prior restraints
need to be used against the press. On the one hand, if a city
is very large the publicity will not make it impossible to
find twelve impartial jurors. On the other hand, if the
town is quite small the imposition of a silence order will
not be effective in keeping information about the defendant
from the people.
'8420 U.S. 469 (1975).
-9331 U.S. 369 (1947).
'9384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6196 S.Ct. at 2807, quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-






sumption" against their use almost insurmountable.
There were four concurring opinions. 66 Justice
Powell took largely the same approach as the Court,
but sought to emphasize the "unique burden that
rests upon the party. . . who undertakes to show the
necessity for prior restraint on pretrial publicity." "
Justice Powell set out specific requirements which
would have to be met to justify a gag order. In his
words there must be a showing that:
(i) there is a clear threat to the fairness of trial, (ii)
such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to he
restrained, and (iii) no less restrictive alternatives are
available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a restraint
may not issue unless it is also shown that previous
publicity or publicity from unrestrained sources will
not render the restraint inefficacious. The threat to
fairness of the trial is to be evaluated in the context of
Sixth Amendment law on impartiality, and any
restraint must comply with the standards of specificity
always required in the First Amendment context. "
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, s9
joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, went
beyond Justice Powell and the opinion of the Court
to conclude that no restrictive order can meet first
amendment requirements. According to Justice
Brennan, any order regarding publicity not yet
published about a criminal trial must be speculative:
A judge importuned to issue a prior restraint in the
pretrial context will be unable to predict the manner in
which the potentially prejudicial information would be
published, the frequency with which it would be
repeated or the emphasis it would be given, the context
in which or purpose for which it would be reported,
the scope of the audience that would be exposed to the
information, or the impact, evaluated in terms of
current standards for assessing juror impartiality, the
information would have on the audience,
"See note 15 supra.
6796 S.Ct. at 2808. (Powell,J., concurring).
"Id. In Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schuling-
kamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Powell, J., in chambers),
vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 985 (1975), Justice Powell ex-
pressed his opinion that a silence order must meet a heavy
presumption against its validity. That analysis has clearly
carried over to this case.
Justice Powell was a member of the original committee of
the ABA which investigated the possibility of standards for
pretrial restrictive orders. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, title page (1968). Though that
committee suggested that restrictive orders he ised only on
a voluntary basis, id. at 112-118, apparently Mr. Justice
Powell would have provided a standard for mandatory
orders if forced to do so.
6996 S.Ct. at 2809. (Brennan,J., concurring).
"Ild. at 2822. This position is consistent with Justice
The speculative basis for the order simply can not be
overcome. Even if the order were not inherently spec-
ulative, Justice Brennan felt that alternative methods
are available to judges fearful of prejudicial public-
ity. 71
Justice Brennan pointed out that, at present, prior
restraints are permissible in only three types of
situations: obscenity, incitements to violence, and
national security. Approval of the Nebraska order
would necessitate an unwise expansion beyond the
three areas approved by prior case law. The expan-
sion would be unwise for several reasons. First, issu-
ance of a gag order might lead the general public to
believe that the person is guilty. 72 Second, the dis-
cretion of the court to issue such orders would in-
evitably be abused. The prosecution and defense
counsel would automatically request such orders,
and the judge, fearful of reversal for not protecting
the rights of the accused, would more often than not
capitulate. "Third, use of such orders might lead the
general public to the belief that the judicial process
was being misused by the judges and the litigants."
The public would have no way of finding out what
was actually happening in the courtrooms. Fourth,
litigants would be wasting their money and the court
system's valuable time in appealing each order. 7
Fifth, and to Justice Brennan the most important
reason to prohibit gag orders, from a lack of
resources or some other reason an order may remain
unchallenged. Thus, even a flagrant violation of the
first amendment might be permitted to stand. 7'
In Justice Brennan's view, a choice between the
first and sixth amendments is unnecessary. The trial
judge has a wide variety of measures to control
publicity, short of infringing on the first amendment
through prior restraints. With sensitive use of those
alternative methods a judge can avoid the conflict of
first and sixth amendment rights.
Justice Brennan's blanket prohibition of restrictive
orders which are directed to the press may be the
opinion ultimately adopted by the Court. In addition
Brennan's prior reasoning as stated in New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) " . . . the First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated
upon surmise or conjecture..".





7 Id. at 2826-27. This is especially true of small news-
papers. They have neither the resources nor the time to
spend in challenging each restrictive order.
1976]
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to Justices Stewart and Marshall who joined Justice
Brennan in his opinion, Justice Stevens stated in a
separate opinion "' that, for the most part, he agreed
with Justice Brennan. However, he could not yet say
that there was no possible situation where prior
restraints might be constitutionally used to protect an
accused's right to a fair trial. At the same time he
noted that if he were "ever required to face the issues
squarely," he might well decide to go along with
Justice Brennan. 78 Justice White in a separate
concurring opinion "' stated that he joined the opin-
ion of the Court, but only because he would like to
see more case law developed before stating a specific
standard. He admitted that he had "grave doubts"
that restrictive orders such as this one could ever be
upheld. 80
But, even without a switch to the Brennan posi-
tion, it is clear that the Court has raised an almost in-
surmountable barrier to judicial orders restricting
pretrial publicity. Any court which attempts to use
such an order must consider: (a) the nature and ex-
tent of coverage, (b) the efficacy of other measures,
and (c) the effectiveness of the restraining order. Its
findings must mandate a restrictive order, not just
suggest the advisability of such an order. There must
be certain prejudice and the restrictions on the press
must be very limited.
The Court's decision is not surprising given its
consistently negative view of any prior restraint on
the press. 81 Although the language in some of its
earlier pre-trial publicity cases may have misled
lower courts into thinking gag orders were permissi-
ble, the Court has clearly resolved any possible
ambiguity in favor of free expression. This decision
thus acts not to extend press protection but rather
to hold the line on any new infringements on press
freedoms. Direct prior restraints of the press are
simply not tolerated by the first amendment as inter-
preted by the Court.
On a purely practical level the decision recognizes
that gag orders are essentially unworkable, and
"Id. at 2830. (Stevens,J., concurring).
78 1d.
" Id. at 2808. (White,J., concurring).
"0 Id.
8 1See note 46 supra.
perhaps counterproductive. 2 No one can know
ahead of time the consequences and effects of publici-
ty. No one can tell whether lack of newspaper
publicity will maintain calm within the community
or, as the Court suggests, give rise to rampant and
damaging rumors. Constitutional rights can not be
subject to guesswork and speculation.
Of course the Court has not yet resolved the fair
trial/free press problem completely. Chief Justice
Burger indicates that past decisions were not a re-
flection on the need for a vigorous press; they were a
signal to judges to take measures to protect the ac-
cused by controlling events in the courtroom itself.
Yet, if the courts must abandon restrictive orders
against the press and replace them with ever-
broadening restraints against trial participants (such
as witnesses and attorneys), the same problems of
free movement of ideas would remain. "5 Further-
more, if the courts may still order members of the
courtroom to avoid commenting on a case, the press
might be held in contempt for publishing what one of
those persons reveals, "'thus preventing open discus-
sion of cases. Perhaps the courts will simply choose
to close all pretrial proceedings. Yet, that closing
might violate the right of a person to a "public"
trial. In the final analysis the Court's insistence on
other methods of protecting an accused's right to fair
trial may create just as many constitutional problems
as would gag orders on the press.
2See notes 55-57 supra.
3See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v.
Chicago Council of Lawyers, 44 U.S.L.W. 3756 (1976). In
that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
D.R. 1.07 as violative of the first amendment. That rule
commands all Illinois lawyers to remain silent on certain
aspects of every case. The Seventh Circuit felt that such a
rule was invalid primarily because it was too broad. The
court did not say that every such rule would violate the first
amendment; only that a rule such as this should not be
applied to every case regardless of the facts involved. There
must be a "serious and imminent threat" to the trial. Id. at
251.
"4At least one California commentator felt that the press
could be held liable for revealing information they know
should not have been disclosed. See Sturm, Judicial Control
of Pretrial and Trial Publicity: A Reexamination of the
Applicable Constitutional Standards, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV., 101, 124 (1975).
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